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This article analyses the discursive construction of agency in narratives of ‘mediated self-care’, 
stories of disease management and/or recovery in which particular material or discursive 
technologies play a central part. Specifically, it analyses two stories of self-care, one told in the 
context of an Alcoholics Anonymous meeting, and the other told in the context of a Quantified 
Self ‘meetup’. The analytical apparatus I will bring to bear on these data is mediated discourse 
analysis (Norris and Jones 2005; Scollon 2001), an approach to discourse whose primary focus is 
on the actions and identities made possible when people appropriate ’technologies’ into 
particular situations (or ‘sites of engagement’). The analysis focuses on how narrators construct 
their relationship with the technologies they use, how they describe the process of mastering 
these technologies, and how these technologies are represented as emblems of group 
membership. The analysis reveals how different kinds of technologies of self-care are associated 
with different constructions of the self and individual agency and different constructions of 
‘wellness’.  
 










Mediated self-care and the question of agency 




This article examines the way people construct agency in narratives of ‘mediated self-care’. 
What I mean by ‘self-care’ is those practices that individuals perform independent of medical 
experts, often in the context of lay communities, through which they seek to optimize their health 
or manage or recover from a particular disease (Ziguras 2013). By the term ‘mediated’ self-care, 
I mean to signal in particular those practices of self-care that are mediated through ‘technologies’ 
— such as iPhone apps, activity trackers, bathroom scales, as well as older technologies such as 
diaries, checklists, and even the ‘technology’ of narrative itself (Bury 1992; Pennebaker and 
Seagal 1999; Reisman 1990). As can be seen from this list, I am using the term ‘technology’ in a 
rather wide sense to mean any ‘cultural tool’ (Vygotsky 1962; Wertsch 1993) that facilitates self-
care.  
 
Some of these technologies are normally thought of as ‘material technologies’ (computers, smart 
phones, bathroom scales), and others as ‘discursive technologies’ (systems of recording and 
calculation, texts and text types such as confessions and narratives). This distinction, however, is 
largely artificial, since all discursive technologies depend on material technologies such as 
notebooks, video screens, or the human voice for their expression, and all material technologies 
depend upon a web of discourse which governs how they are used, who can use them when and 
where, and what kinds of ‘communities’ of users they are associated with (Jones 2016a, b). Put 
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simply, this article is concerned with how we talk about the tools we use to keep ourselves well, 
how these tools come to define what kinds of people we are, what kinds of communities we align 
ourselves to, and what meanings ‘health’ has in our lives.   
 
The analytical apparatus with which I will approach these narratives is mediated discourse 
analysis (Norris and Jones 2005; Scollon 2001), an approach to discourse whose primary focus is 
on the actions and identities made possible when people appropriate different material and 
discursive technologies into particular situations (or ‘sites of engagement’). Mediated discourse 
analysis has the potential to take us beyond just considering how people talk about their health to 
understanding how this talk is inevitably embedded in complex entanglements of bodies, 
technologies, communities and selves (Lupton 2014; Scollon 2001).  
 
The analysis focuses on two examples of stories of self-care associated with two distinct 
communities: the community of recovering alcoholics in Alcoholics Anonymous, and the other, 
the community of ‘self-trackers’ aligned with a movement that has come to be known as The 
Quantified Self (Wolf 2010). Although participants in these communities engage in very 
different kinds of projects of self-care for very different reasons and with very different goals, 
they display striking similarities in their reliance on technologies as meditational means to 
engage in these projects, in the way they structure stories around their uses of these technologies, 
and in how these stories themselves come to mediate their engagement with these technologies. .  
 
There has, of course, been considerable work on narratives as a resource through which people 
faced with health issues make sense of their conditions (see for example Frank 1995; Kleinman 
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1988; Reissman 1990, 1993), as well as on therapeutic narratives told in the context of self-help 
groups like Alcoholics Anonymous (see for example Cain 1991; Humphreys 2000). Where my 
approach differs is in my focus on technologies as ‘characters’ in these stories, and how these 
narratives serve to imbue these technologies with meaning.   
 
In what follows I will first expand on the relationship of ‘self-care’ to the cultural tools people 
use to perform it, using Foucault’s [ref?] concept of ‘technologies of the self’. Then I will 
describe my data and methodology, especially the framework of mediated discourse analysis that 
I use to analyse the data, before going on to compare and contrast two emblematic narratives of 
self-care. I will end with a discussion of how people portray their agentive relationships with the 
technologies they use to maintain their health or manage their recoveries and the implications of 
this for health behaviour more generally.  
 
Self-care and technologies of the self 
The World Health Organization (1983: 2) defines self-care as ‘the activities individuals, families 
and communities undertake with the intention of enhancing health, preventing disease, limiting 
illness, and restoring health…derived from knowledge and skills from the pool of both 
professional and lay experience…(and) undertaken by lay people on their own behalf...’. Self-
care includes all sorts of practices from diet and exercise regimens, to home remedies, from 
cosmetic surgery to religious rituals. They are not just individual practices aimed at solving 
health problems, but social practices which come to perform particular social functions and to 




Self-care practices, of course, are not new. In fact, they long predate the development of 
professional healthcare practices. With the rise of personal digital technologies such as smart 
phones and wearable computers, however, there has been renewed interest in the ways self-care 
is mediated through technologies (Topol 2012). Such technologies include motion sensors that 
track users’ physical activity and calorie consumption, sleep monitors and wifi scales, and a host 
of apps that help people to keep track of things like how much water they drink and how much 
sex they have (see Jones 2015). But the mediation of self-care through technologies is also not 
new. The philosopher Peter-Paul Verbeek (2011), drawing on the work of Foucault, insists that 
the essence of self-care has always been the interaction between humans and technologies, and 
the study of self-care is basically the study of how ‘technologically mediated subjects come into 
being’ (Verbeek 2011: 83). 
 
Foucault (1988, 2003), in his famous examination of practices of self-care in ancient Greece and 
early Christian societies, calls the technologies through which practices of self-care are mediated 
‘technologies of the self’, which he defines as those technologies  
 ‘which permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a 
certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way 
of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, 
purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality’ (2003: 225).  
Among the most important technologies people in the ancient world used in the practice of self-
care, he notes, was the technology of writing. In the ancient world, he writes (1988: 28), ‘a 
relation developed … between writing and vigilance. Attention was paid to nuances of life, 
mood, and reading, and the experience of oneself was intensified and widened by virtue of this 
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act of writing.’ 
 
In his analysis, Foucault focuses on two kinds of practices of self-care, the kind which was 
inwardly directed, which involved keeping diaries and notebooks — recording and reviewing 
what one has done or should have done, and reading and reflecting on the writings of others — 
and the kind that was directed outward, consisting of writing treatises and letters in order to 
share one’s experiences, actions and reflections with others. These two modes of self-care 
popular among the Stoics persisted in early Christian practices of meditation and confession, and 
continue to be seen in the activities of ‘self-help’ groups, like Alcoholics Anonymous, which 
encourage members to engage in taking self-inventories and narrativizing their experiences, and 
the more recent practices of ‘self-tracking’ and ‘sharing one’s data’ that are associated with the 
Quantified Self movement. 
 
The most important point Foucault makes about ‘technologies of the self’ (and why they are such 
effective tools for self-care) is that the act of entextualising (Jones 2009) –  i.e. transforming 
one’s thoughts, actions, feelings or experiences into texts – inevitably brings about a new way of 
experiencing the self, and, eventually brings about a ‘new self’. ‘Technologies of the self’ 
operate chiefly by creating opportunities for ‘reflexivity’ (Archer 2007), the capacity for thought 
or action to ‘bend back upon itself’ and create a kind of awareness on the part of the social actor 
that can alter subsequent thought or action.  
 
In both of the contexts I am interested in this paper — Alcoholics Anonymous meetings and 
Quantified Self meetups — individuals regularly discuss their use of ‘technologies of the self’ in 
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the context of stories they tell to other users. While my main interest is in how narrators of these 
stories describe the way they use ‘technologies of the self’ — such as texts, self-inventories, 
wearable sensors, iPhone apps and online social networks — to mediate practices of self-care, I 
am also interested in how these narratives themselves operate as ‘technologies of the self’, 
enabling participants to entextualise their experiences in ways that facilitate introspection, self-
regulation, sharing and the elicitation of feedback. 
 
Studies of narratives of illness and health have mostly focused on how storytellers represent their 
experiences, how they temporally construct their illness ‘journeys’, how they portray their 
relationships with healthcare workers and other caregivers, and how they construct their 
identities (see for example Bury 2001; Frank 1995). Some scholars have also examined the way 
tellers of illness narratives express agency in relation to their disease, healthcare professionals 
(see for example Arduser 2014), and even the technologies used to cure them or keep them well. 
In most cases these technologies are portrayed as part of the system of biomedical expertise that 
‘colonises’ the body of the ill person and transforms him or her from an autonomous individual 
into a ‘patient’ (Frank 1995), rather than as a means through which individuals might exercise 
agency and become more independent. Lapum and her colleagues (2010: 754), for example, 
describe how, in the stories of patients who were recovering from open heart surgery, technology 
came to assume a controlling influence on how participants’ narratives were shaped and 
unfolded, resulting in patients themselves ‘becoming background characters and surrendering 
agency.’ In contrast, as we will see below, in narratives of mediated self-care, people more often 




At the same time, there has also been a tradition of narrative analysis in health communication 
that has seen narratives themselves as technologies through which people manage disease, deal 
with the ‘biographical disruption’ that comes with health problems, reconstruct their identities, 
and achieve a renewed sense of independence (see for example Bury 1982, 2001; Frank 1995; 
Kleinman 1988; Reissman 1990). Frank (1995) argues that telling stories is a means by which 
the ill seek to regain agency by showing that they can be ‘successfully ill’ (Frank 1995: 62). 
Others, such as Bury (2001), have noted that illness narratives give their tellers the opportunity 
to legitimate their ‘expertise’ — borne of the lived experience of managing a disease or medical 
condition — and to contest the dominance of biomedical frameworks of expertise around health 
and illness.  
 
Data and methodology 
In what follows I will illustrate some of the concepts I discussed above through the close analysis 
of two narratives of self-care: one told in the context of an Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) 
meeting, and the other told in the context of a Quantified Self (QS) meetup. Both are publicly 
available online. 1 The narratives are part of a larger study on narratives of self-care involving a 
corpus of stories collected from YouTube and other internet platforms (see also Jones 2013, 
2016). These two case studies were selected because they both involve practices of self-care in 
which the use of particular ‘technologies of the self’ is emblematic of membership in a particular 
community, each with its own ideological stance towards health and individual agency. The AA 
narrative is told by Lizz H. as part of a ‘speaker’s meeting’. While the sharing of narratives is 
part of all AA meetings, ‘speaker’s meetings’ are a special kind of meeting at which a veteran 
member is invited to deliver a more formal and sustained narrative. The QS narrative is told by 
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Kevin Krejci, a tech worker in the San Francisco Bay area who, about a year before this talk, had 
been diagnosed with Parkinson’s disease. His narrative relates how he came to use various self-
tracking tools to help him manage his condition.  
 
My  aim is to use these narratives as a means of uncovering some of the ways people use 
discourse to 1) represent their relatinships with ‘technologies of the self’ — whether they be 
material technologies like wearable sensors or semiotic technologies like written inventories or 
data visualisations; 2) represent processes by which they have come to master these technologies 
and make them part of their social practices; and 3) promote these technologies and the practices 
associated with them as aspects of group identity and emblems of group membership.  In 
understanding the way narrators organize their stories around these technologies, my key focus 
will be on how agency is discursively constructed. 
 
Analytical Approach 
Mediated discourse analysis, the analytical framework through which I am analysing these 
stories, conceives of agency as a matter of mediation, locating it in the ‘irreducible tension 
between the technologies people use and the unique, contextualized use of these technologies in 
carrying out particular concrete actions (Wertsch 1994).  For mediated discourse analysts, 
agency is always distributed among human actors, technologies and the various discourses that 
circulate through them (see also Latour 1991). The task of the analyst is to explore how social 
actors discursively construct their relationships with these technologies and discourses. Such 
constructions may involve the ascription of agency to themselves, to the mediational means they 
are using, to the social situation (or ‘scene’), to some kind of external goal or purpose, or to the 
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action itself (Burke 1969; Scollon and Scollon 2005). These discursive constructions of agency, 
however, are not seen so much as ‘windows into the souls’ of actors, revealing the degree to 
which they ‘feel in control’. Rather, they are seen as means through which individuals 
strategically perform social actions, enact social identities, and position themselves within 
communities of practice (Lave and Wenger 1991).  
 
Lizz H. and the textual tools of Alcoholics Anonymous 
Alcoholics Anonymous is a group that helps people to recover from alcoholism by engaging 
them in a variety of discursive practices mediated through ‘technologies of the self’. Through 
these practices members re-enact the conceptual framework for alcoholism promoted by the 
group and come to ‘understand their own conditions through the discursive constructions of the 
group’ (Ziguras 2013:169). These tools include: 1) lists (the most important being the list of the 
‘12 Steps’ to recovery); 2) narratives (printed in the ‘Big Book’ [Alcoholics Anonymous, 1939] 
and told orally at meetings); 3) personal inventories written as part of ‘Step Four’; 4) confessions 
and verbal encounters designed to make ‘amends’ to those who have been harmed by the past 
behaviour of participants; 5) prayers, slogans, and other formulaic texts; and 6) material 
technologies such as coloured plastic chips that members receive after they have remained sober 
for a certain amount of time. Narratives, like the one told by Lizz H., typically recount how 
members have recovered through engaging with these tools. These narratives, as mentioned 
above, are themselves among the ‘technologies of the self’ members use to facilitate their 
recovery.  
 
Alcoholics anonymous stories generally follow a three part structure in which tellers relate 1) 
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what their lives were like while they were drinking; 2) how they came to be socialised into the 
practices of Alcoholics Anonymous (‘what happened’); and 3) what their lives are like now. This 
three-part structure is outlined in a passage from the ‘Big Book’ called ‘How it works’, which is 
often read aloud at meetings: 
 
Our stories disclose in a general way what we used to be like, what happened, and what 
we are like now (Alcoholics Anonymous 1939:10). 
 
And when storytellers in Alcoholics Anonymous meetings tell their stories, they often begin with 
a metadiscursive reference to this three part structure as a kind of ‘abstract’ (Labov and 
Waletzky 1966). This is the case with Lizz H., who starts her story:  
 
Hi everyone, my name is Lizz, and I’m an alcoholic. (audience: Hi Lizz). My sobriety 
date is July 21, 1995 (audience: applause). Um, I would like to thank the committee for 
asking me to come and join you. This is actually a roundup that I’ve always wanted to 
attend but never had the opportunity, so I’m super excited to be here, thank you so much 
(audience: applause). And thank you to Mary and Christine who have taken such good 
care of me since I’ve been here. Two a.m. they picked me up from the airport, can you 
believe it? That’s very nice. Um, alright, so I guess I’ll tell you a little bit about what it 
was like what happened and what it's like now. I grew up in California in the bay area… 
 
In this case, this explication of the tripartite structure of the recovery story at the beginning of 
this narrative functions not just as a rhetorical device to frame the story that is about to be told, 
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but also as an intertextual reference to the passage from the ‘Big Book’ cited above, and to other 
stories by other members the teller and her audience have heard. In other words, it is an explicit 
reference to the set of rules associated with this particular ‘technology of the self’ which is 
shared by the community, and, as such, a means by which Lizz H. portrays herself as a 
competent member. It is also a representation of a certain relationship of agency between the 
teller and the narrative, an acknowledgement, first of all, that she will be talking about ‘what 
happened’ to her as opposed to ‘what she did’, and, second of all, that the way she will be talking 
about this is also not determined by her -- in a sense, it is not she who is telling her story, but the 
story that is ‘telling her’.  
 
Another example of the instantiation of a community practice in the structure Lizz’s narrative is 
the traditional way in which she begins (‘Hi everybody, my name is Lizz, and I’m an alcoholic’), 
which is an enactment of the first of the 12 Steps to recovery (‘We admitted we were powerless 
over alcohol - that our lives had become unmanageable’). Again, this statement and the 
intertextual reference it performs, positions the teller in a particular agentive relationship with 
alcohol, with alcoholism, with ‘her life’, and with the story she is about to tell. And just as the 
‘First Step’ structures the beginning of the story, the rest of the story is structured around the 
subsequent eleven steps of the program as the narrator recounts her road to recovery. This 
journey is essentially the story of her mastery of various material and discursive technologies and 
her use of these technologies to negotiate her agentive relationship with the world and with her 
‘alcoholic self’. In other words, the act of telling the story itself is mediated through a 





As with most AA stories, the first part of Lizz’s story recounts her life before her engagement 
with the AA program, portraying it as ‘unmanageable’, and like most AA stories, this involves 
accounts of incidents with drinking and their consequences. What is particularly interesting about 
Lizz’s story, however, is her characterization of her pre-recovery self as discursively deficient, 
lacking in the kinds of literacy skills so central to most of the technologies of the self the group 
makes available to members as means to recovery: she talks about her inability to read, and her 
inability to talk to others: 
 
I was doing so poorly in school that they put me in the books on tape English class so it 
was me and the other kids that couldn't read basically you know were either English as a 
second language or were just as delinquent as I was. 
 
I wouldn't talk to you if you spoke to me. I would swear at you and I couldn't tell the truth 
if you ask me a direct question I wouldn't answer and … I didn't want to hear anything 
you had to say to me. 
 
Her first step towards recovery, then, is essentially a ‘literacy’ event in which she begins to 
understand agency as a matter of being able to master the discursive tools of the program, which, 
in her case, involved learning how to read:  
 
I looked at this woman Deb and I asked her for help, and Debbie became my first 
sponsor. Um, now, we opened the big book of Alcoholics Anonymous and none of it 
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made any sense to me at all. I you know hadn't read for quite some time, I was bad at it, 
comprehension was not, it just wasn't there for me, you know, it was all  just super 
cloudy and foggy and and so we put the Big Book back down and we practiced reading 
first, and eventually we picked it back up and she's like all right we're gonna go word by 
word. If you don't understand something ask and I'll explain it to you. she got out a 
dictionary and we started reading and we got to the First Step. 
 
Interestingly, Lizz’s engagement with the linguistic aspects of the tools of recovery is replicated 
in her portrayal of her ‘Twelfth Step’ (‘Having had a spiritual awakening as the result of these 
steps, we tried to carry this message to alcoholics, and to practice these principles in all our 
affairs’) in which she recounts using the Big Book as a means to communicate with fellow 
alcoholics when she was living in Russia: 
 
We went to Moscow, we got on the train went to Moscow and visited Constantine at the 
GSO in Moscow and bought a bunch of Big Books and Twelve and Twelves and sat 
down with my English Big Book on one side and a Russian Big Book on the other and I 
took these two guys through the twelve steps of Alcoholics Anonymous (applause) and, 
you know, they saved my life again you guys saved my life. 
 
Consistently in her story, Lizz portrays her mastery of the textual tools of Alcoholics Anonymous 
as a means by which she redefines agency through coming to understand herself in terms of her 
relationships with people and objects in the world. To some extent, this process also involves a 
surrender of agency to the tools she is engaged with, and the ways these tools enable and 
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constrain certain ways of negotiating these relationships. As with many AA stories, Lizz’s story 
is full of examples of her negotiating this tension between her using the tools, and the tools 
‘using her’. In her account of her ‘Fourth Step’ (‘We made a searching and fearless moral 
inventory of ourselves’), for example, she talks about how she used the process of making an 
inventory as a means of avoiding getting to the ‘Fifth Step’ (‘We admitted to God, to ourselves, 
and to another human being the exact nature of our wrongs’):  
 
My first Fourth Step was over three-hundred typed pages. I really was terrified of doing a 
Fifth Step you know like I had never experienced unconditional love of my life, and I 
thought for sure if I told another human being all of these things, all of these resentments, 
all these things that I’ve done, all these situations I've been in, that and she would walk 
away, you know, and then what do I do, and so I just kept writing you know I wrote and 
wrote and wrote… 
 
The thing that characterizes all of the steps that Lizz recounts in her narrative –  labelling herself 
an alcoholic, learning to see herself in the descriptions of alcoholism in the Big Book, making a 
‘fearless’ self-inventory, and confessing her defects to herself, to God, and to another human 
being—is the act of engaging with a ‘textual double’, a discursive representation of herself 
which conforms to the identity of an alcoholic promoted by the group, and of surrendering  her 
old self to this new identity. The point of this exercise is not to replace a ‘natural’ or ‘real’ self 
with a discursively constructed one, but to come to the realization that the self one always 
believed oneself to be was also discursively constructed, that one of the essential problems of 
alcoholism is that it leads people to construct unhealthy textual doubles which are at odds with 
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what they are actually doing and how they are actually behaving. The Big Book (Alcoholics 
Anonymous 1939: 73) puts it this way:   
 
More than most people, the alcoholic leads a double life. He is very much the actor. To 
the outer world he presents his stage character. This is the one he likes his fellows to see. 
He wants to enjoy a certain reputation, but knows in his heart he doesn't deserve it. 
The inconsistency is made worse by the things he does on his sprees. Coming to his 
senses, he is revolted at certain episodes he vaguely remembers. These memories are a 
nightmare. He trembles to think someone might have observed him. As fast as he can, he 
pushes these memories far inside himself. He hopes they will never see the light of day. 
He is under constant fear and tension - that makes for more drinking. 
 
The effects of this process of trading in this ‘contradictory self’ for a more ‘honest’ and ‘fearless’ 
discursive construction are described by Lizz H. as follows: 
 
I no longer had to walk down the street with my head down I no longer had to keep my 
hair in my face I could ask you how you were doing and I could care about what you said 
back to me and you know that wasn't holding on to all of that anymore like I wasn't afraid 
that you would figure out who I really was. 
 
In this statement can be seen both of the dimensions of ‘technologies of the self that Foucault 
(1988, 2003) describes: the reflective dimension and the communicative dimension, as well as 
how these dimensions interact with each other. The construction of this ‘more accurate’ ‘textual 
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double’ is facilitated by being able to share it with others, and it is also what makes the act of 
sharing with others possible. In this sense, Lizz’s authoring of herself is not an individual act, but 
an act of ‘collaborative writing’ that is performed together with the other members of the group 
and with the tools the group provides. Throughout her story, in fact, she credits the group as a 
whole with her success: 
 
Your love changed my life and what happened for me was I was able to look at myself in 
the mirror for the first time in my life, you know, I was able to build on the foundation to 
have relationships with other human beings. 
 
I finally felt like I was home you know like you loved me you made me feel safe and now 
I was finally home. 
  
It is not just, as Cain (1991) and others have pointed out, that the discursive tools (such as 
narrative) provided by AA equip members with the means to become socialized into the group 
through ‘legitimate peripheral participation’  (Lave and Wenger 1991), but also that the group 
itself becomes a tool as members discursively reconstruct it and carry those reconstructions to 
other alcoholics through service. Lizz says: 
 
Like I got to carry your voice and it was such a privilege and yeah the love that our 





Bateson (1972), in his famous analysis of Alcoholics Anonymous, attributes the success of the 
program to the way it helps members orient towards a more cybernetic view of the world (see 
Wiener 1948) in which agency is shared between the human actor and his environment. Rather 
than simply a surrender of agency, he says, the First Step is ‘a change in epistemology, a change 
in how to know about the personality-in-the-world’ (Bateson 1972: 313). In this new 
epistemology, members see themselves not as independent agents who think, act and decide, but 
as parts of ‘a larger field of interlocking processes’ which ‘does the thinking, acting and 
deciding’. As Lizz says: 
 
I learned really early on that I just do what I'm told here and everything seems to work 
out alright. 
 
Although such a sentiment might run contrary to our contemporary Western notions of freedom, 
agency and self-efficacy, the point that Bateson would make is that such a surrender does not 
constitute giving up agency so much as learning to share it productively with the people and the 
tools in one's environment. In the case of Alcoholics Anonymous, then, recovery is a process 
through which agency is gradually reconceptualised as a matter of the reciprocal relationships 
between the social actor and the tools with which members mediate their experience of the 
world. The program operates through a kind of paradox, the promise that surrendering control is 
the only way to regain it.  
 
Kevin Krejci: Outsmarting Parkinson’s with data 
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The second example of a narrative of mediated self-care I would like to present is the story of 
Kevin Krejci, a Silicon Valley tech worker with Parkinson’s disease who talked about his efforts 
to ‘outsmart’ his condition through self-quantification in a Quantified Self Meetup in San 
Francisco in January of 2014. The Quantified Self is a community which, at the time this story 
was told, consisted of a network of over 170 groups with over 35,000 members in 121 cities and 
38 countries around the world (http://quantified-self.meetup.com). These groups hold regular 
‘meetups’ at which members take turns giving short, narrative presentations (usually supported 
by PowerPoint slides) of their experiences with self-quantification. Interestingly, like the stories 
told at Alcoholics Anonymous Meetings which describe recovery in terms of ‘what we used to 
be like, what happened, and what we are like now’, the narratives told at Quantified Self 
Meetups also have a tripartite structure. The website of the Quantified Self community, in fact, 
explicitly instructs members that the stores they tell at meetups should answer ‘three prime 
questions’:  
 
1) What did you do? 
2) How did you do it? 
3) What did you learn? 
 
And just as Lizz H. explicitly references the community sanctioned story structure of AA in her 
talk, Kevin Krejci alludes to the ‘prime questions’ of the Quantified Self community both in what 







lesson learned (so far) 
 
At the same time, there are important differences in the ways stories are told in this community, 
and the way narrators use these stories to discursively construct agency. One difference is 
apparent in the ways the two communities talk about storytelling. As mentioned above, in AA, 
the agency of the narrator is downplayed in the formulation ‘what we used to be like, what 
happened, and what we are like now.’ In the QS formulation, on the other hand, the agency of the 
teller is highlighted, with the narrator focusing on what s/he did, and what s/he learned. Another 
key difference is that AA stories are framed as stories of transformation (‘what we used to be 
like’ being contrasted with ‘what we are like now’), whereas QS stories are stories of ‘learning’. 
That is not to say that QS stories do not involve transformation; most of them do. But this 
transformation is regarded as the product of creating ‘new’ knowledge rather than understanding 
the self in terms of a body of knowledge already provided by the community. 
 
Related to the points above are the different ways AA and QS narratives provide for narrators to 
present themselves and position themselves as characters in their own stories. AA recovery 
stories, such as Lizz H’s story, typically begin with narrators identifying themselves as 
‘alcoholics’, a ritual of identification which enacts the surrender of what, in AA, is viewed as an 
illusion of agency. Kevin Krejci also begins his story with an introduction, but his introduction 




Okay I’m Kevin Krejci business development manager Fujitsu labs and a dad of two boys 
and also a dude with PD. 
 
While in many ways, this introduction seems more individualistic and agentive, it also achieves 
for Kevin the function of ritually aligning himself with recognisable identities in this community: 
his mention of his occupation helps him to claim expertise in the kinds of technical skills needed 
for self-quantification, his identification of himself as a father helps to humanize him, and his 
identification as ‘a dude with PD’ identifies the problem he is trying to solve. All of these 
identities resurface later in his talk. He later invokes his family, explaining that his main goal in 
quantifying himself is so that he can ‘be there for them’, and he talks about his job as providing 
resources for him to develop new ways to understand his disease. It is his treatment of his 
disease, however, that is the most interesting aspect of his identity construction, and the aspect 
that contrasts most dramatically with Lizz H.  The most obvious difference is that this aspect of 
his identity is construed as an attribute he possesses (something he ‘has’) rather than as an 
intrinsic quality (something that he ‘is’, such as a ‘dad’ or a ‘business development manager). In 
fact, while one of the central purposes of an AA story is to demonstrate that the narrator has fully 
taken on the identity of ‘an alcoholic’, the story of Kevin Krejci – and many other self-
quantifiers –  is an effort to distance himself from identification with his disease or problem. This 
is accomplished  through the construction of an alternate identity, a ‘data double’ composed of 
the aggregate of all the carefully collected statistics about his bodily ‘performance’ of the disease 
over time, resemiotized by the various ‘technologies of the self’ he has available to him into 




This process of distancing begins at the start  of his talk with his first two slides, the first (Fig. 1) 
declaring ‘I’m a dude with PD, accompanied by a screenshot of his Twitter profile, complete 
with a picture of him smiling in a tuxedo, and the second (Fig. 2), with the title ‘What is PD?’, 
showing a drawing of a stooped, elderly looking PD ‘sufferer’, about which he says: 
 
That’s me…maybe. No! I’m trying to avoid that. PD is a neurodegenerative disease that 
makes it hard to pronounce words like neurodegenerative. And it’s basically a motor 
disorder, so guys like me might end of looking like that a little before we should. 
 
This contrast between his ‘real self’ (represented by his Twitter profile), and what he might 
become, were he to give in to conventional definitions of what it means to be ‘a dude with PD’, 
serves as an abstract for the remainder of the story, which is essentially a story of fighting against 
this conventional ‘patient identity’ by constructing a new identity for himself through the process 
of analysing and understanding his disease. This story is summed up in the quote from Michael J. 
Fox which he projects on a later slide: ‘Quote from Michael J Fox, he got diagnosed twenty-





Figure 1 Figure 2 
 
 As I noted above, AA narratives are orgainzed around how narrators master and use the tools the 
program makes available to them, such as the ‘12 Steps’, and the making of lists and taking of 
‘personal inventories’.  Talks at Quantified Self meetups are also organized around processes of 
tool mastery and use. In fact, in QS narratives, the tools are even more explicitly thematized. 
According to the group’s website, sharing in QS meetups is organized around ‘asking big 
questions about our self-tracking tools and what we do with them’ (Boesel 2013). For AA 
members, their stories are about ‘what happened to us and how the tools we used made that 
possible,’ whereas for QS members, their stories are more about ‘what tools we used and how 
they helped us to learn something about ourselves or change our behavior.’ In fact, there is 
considerable attention in talks by quantified selfers like Kevin Krejci to the technological aspects 
of the tools they use, and how these technological aspects serve to ‘energise’ them and push them 
to rethink their relationships with their bodies (Ruckenstein and Pantzar 2015).  This relationship 
with technology is evidenced in Kevin Krejci’s talk, in which he describes his devices (‘his 
friends’) in terms of what they can do, and how their technological affordances serve to motivate 
him: 
 
So these are my friends, they’re helping me to collect the data. Um, I’ve got Fitbit, 
iHealth taking my blood pressure, Bodymedia on this shoulder. My Withings scale, got 
this little Zeypher …whatchamacallit. I don’t even know what they call it, it tracks quite 
a few things…Fitbit’s helping keep me motivated. I use Map my Fitness to to do family 
hikes and then do runs around the track and measure with Runkeeper. And loosing 
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weight’s good for all of us too, including PD patients like me, and my Withing scale’s 
inspiring me everyday to jump on there and see how I’m doing with that…And the folks 
at APDM Movement monitoring solutions were kind enough to loan me one of their cool 
kits over here you can look at later. Put some sensors around different parts of the body to 
measure movement monitoring like sway, how, you know gait, how well my arms are 
swinging and so on and they have a little panel here you can look at that, you know, 
different tests you can run, based on where you put the sensors, and what kind of 
exercises you do. Generate some graphs, which we all love to look at, but sometimes are 
hard to decipher. 
 
Implicit in this account is not just a faith in technology, but a faith in data, a belief that the more 
data one collects the better. In other words, alongside the apparent ‘goal directed’ orientation of 
the Quantified Self movement, there is also a commitment to self-tracking even in the absence of 
clear goals. ‘For many self-trackers,’ writes Gary Wolf (2010: n.p.), the founder of the 
movement, ‘the goal is unknown. Although they may take up tracking with a specific question in 
mind, they continue because they believe their numbers hold secrets that they can’t afford to 
ignore, including answers to questions they have not yet thought to ask.’  
 
For Kevin, his ‘life goals’, to ‘maximize productivity, make my boss happy, make my wife 
happy and my kids happy … reduce stress’ are seen as intrinsically tied up with, and even 
dependent upon, his ‘QS goals’, to ‘find efficient ways to measure and track my condition, 
establish some solid baselines, try some experiments and learn from them.’ Similarly, what 
Kevin learns from his tools has just as much to do with the tools and processes of self-tracking as 
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it does with his condition. In fact, one might say that he has to some degree replaced the problem 
of having Parkinson's disease with the problem of figuring out how to best entextualize 
Parkinson's disease. 
 
Lessons learned so far? Tracking is no easy task. Um, it requires a lot of discipline and 
commitment as we all know. But it’s fun, and data’s too scattered and hard to cross 
correlate, but that’s where the real fun’s gonna be…Challenges to quantify me, It’s 
routines, routines, routines. Just trying to, you know, remember to charge the devices, 
don’t lose my cables, and just make time for everything. Including family and work…it’s 
turning that data, big data into good data, finding that good data… and turning it into 
actionable wisdom.  
 
Among the most powerful ideological positions of the Quantified Self movement is a faith in the 
power of ‘feedback’, an explicit promotion of what Bateson (1972) would characterize as a 
‘cybernetic epistemology’. This focus on feedback is evident in much of the Quantified Self 
literature, including an often shared article from Wired magazine entitled ‘Harnessing the power 
of feedback loops’ in which the author Thomas Goetz (2011) writes: 
 
…feedback taps into something core to the human experience, even to our biological 
origins. Like any organism, humans are self-regulating creatures, with a multitude of 
systems working to achieve homeostasis. Evolution itself, after all, is a feedback loop, 
albeit one so elongated as to be imperceptible by an individual. Feedback loops are how 
we learn, whether we call it trial and error or course correction. In so many areas of life, 
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we succeed when we have some sense of where we stand and some evaluation of our 
progress. (n.p.) 
 
There are, however, important differences in the way the Quantified Self movement talks about 
feedback and the way it is discussed by Bateson, especially in his analysis of the epistemology of 
Alcoholics Anonymous. First, there is the belief that technology makes feedback ‘better’ or 
‘more efficient’, and that more data results in more useful feedback, a premise most 
cyberneticians would dispute. Despite his characterization of feedback as ‘something core to the 
human experience,’ for example, Goetz depicts it as something that was relatively under-utilized 
until the advent of digital technology: 
 
Despite the volume of research and a proven capacity to affect human behavior, we don’t 
often use feedback loops in everyday life. Blame this on two factors: Until now, the 
necessary catalyst—personalized data—has been an expensive commodity… Second, 
collecting data on the cheap is cumbersome. Although the basic idea of self-tracking has 
been available to anyone willing to put in the effort, few people stick with the routine of 
toting around a notebook, writing down every Hostess cupcake they consume or every 
flight of stairs they climb. (n.p.) 
 
Bateson’s view. however, in his explanation of the therapeutic utility of AA, is not so much that 
‘technologies of the self’ set up new ‘more efficient’ feedback loops, but that they help members 
become aware of the way their lives are already governed by feedback loops. Feedback loops do 




The second difference is that, for quantified-selfers, engaging with feedback is seen as a way of 
‘gaining control’ over one’s life. ‘The true power of feedback loops’, writes Goetz, ‘is not to 
control people but to give them control.’ Bateson, of course, would make the opposite point, that 
‘control’ is always shared among multiple entities in the system and to believe that any one entity 
is in ‘control’ is to fall into the distortion of Cartesian dualism.  
 
Finally, there is a distinct difference between Kevin Krejci’s story and Lizz H.’s story in how the 
community itself is constructed around ‘technologies of the self’. This is perhaps not surprising, 
since members of AA have a common goal (‘to stay sober and to help others recover from 
alcoholism’), and a common set of tools that they use, often in pairs (with a ‘sponsor’) or in 
groups (in the context of meetings). Quantified selfers, however, come to the community with 
disparate goals, ranging from managing chronic diseases to improving their personal 
relationships, and use disparate tools to meet these goals, tools they typically use alone. A 
common way quantified selfers refer to themselves is as ‘an n of 1’, a designation which 
highlights their commitment to self-experimentation and their suspicion of knowledge based on 
large clinical trials. In other words, the Quantified Self community is very much a community of 
individuals whose strength is seen to come from the individual efforts — the ‘self-care 
entrepreneurship’ — of individual members. While Lizz H. frequently addresses her audience as 
‘you’ (constructing them as representative of the whole community), Kevin Krejci does not refer 
to his audience at all. Nor does he construct himself as a member of a community beyond 
referring to himself as ‘a big quantified self fan’. His orientation towards the community is 
instead an orientation towards particular individuals in the community that have helped or 
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inspired him:  
 
E-patient Dave was here a few years ago and really inspired me, got me to start tracking 
my sleep and a few other things back then, even though I didn’t know why I was doing it. 
Very inspirational to see, hear his story. 
 
There is, however, one type of orientation towards collective experience that is central to the 
Quantified Self movement, involving sharing one’s data with others engaged in similar 
experiments and trying to gain insights through the aggregation of ‘quantified selves’ — an ‘n of 
many’ — and Krejci does allude to this orientation, talking about his involvement in patient 
social networks like ‘Patients Like Me’: 
 
I am part of the n of many, the us contributing my data to services like 23andMe and 
Patients Like Me, Care Together, and trying to connect with people and all those social 
networks, share good stories and data. 
 
The kind of the collective experience that comes from being part of an aggregation, however, is 
very different from the experience of being part of a community. For quantified-selfers, then, the 
QS community is seen as a source of resources (data, tools and advice on techniques of using 
them) rather than, as in AA, as a resource itself, part of a system of distributed agency which 
supports members in their recovery. 
 
In the Quantified Self movement, then, self-care is discursively constructed as a process of 
31 
 
entextualizing the self with the purpose of setting up ‘feedback loops’ which may (or may not) 
result in ‘learning’. In many cases, just being in possession of data is seen as a form of 
‘learning’. These processes are centrally focused on technologies, which are seen as the means to 
‘self-knowledge’, with the search for self-knowledge frequently associated with the search for 
‘better technologies’. Agency is construed as a matter of controlling the world (including the 
self) through knowledge.  
 
Conclusion 
In both of these stories, self-care is construed as a practice of using ‘technologies of 
entextualization’ (Jones 2009) to construct ‘a new self’ — whether it be Lizz H.’s ‘textual self’ or 
Kevin Krejci’s ‘data double’. In both cases, this ‘new self’ is perpetually unfinished, a ‘work in 
progress’. These narratives, then, serve as canvases upon which the negotiation between the past 
self, the present (better) self and a future (even better) self is enacted (Bode and Kristensen 2015; 
Hawkes 1977). In this regard, one of the most important things about the discursive construction 
of self-care that these two stories illustrate is the role of ‘technologies of the self’ in bridging the 
gap between epistemology and ontology —the way we come to know ourselves and the kinds of 
selves we are able to be. In both of these examples, the relationship between knowing and being 
is reciprocal and mediated through technologies which allow us to construct ourselves as objects 
of knowledge and to construct from that knowledge new ways of being. As Bateson (1972: 113) 
puts it:  
 
In the natural history of the living human being, ontology and epistemology cannot be 
separated. His (commonly unconscious) beliefs about what sort of world it is will 
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determine how he sees it and acts within it, and his ways of perceiving and acting will 
determine his beliefs about its nature. The living man is thus bound within a net of 
epistemological and ontological premises which—regardless of ultimate truth or falsity—
become partially self-validating for him. 
 
Where these two stories differ is that, while for Lizz H., the process of constructing a textual self 
facilitates a dismantling of the illusion of agency, for Kevin and his fellow quantified-selfers, the 
process of constructing data doubles is portrayed as helping them to regain a sense of control 
over their bodies and their lives. While, the ‘textual selves’ AA members create provide for them 
a new way of being, the data doubles that quantified-selfers create provide for them a new way 
of thinking. Finally, the communities which provide these technologies and into whose practices 
the narrators are socialized are construed very differently. Whereas the Quantified self-movement 
is a source of resources for self-care, the AA community is itself a resource, itself a technology 
upon which members draw upon in their recovery.  
 
Despite these key differences, both of these stories reveal that self-care is not just an individual 
practice, but a social practice. Even in the context of the individualistic, libertarian philosophy of 
the Quantified Self movement, self-care depends crucially on the kinds of technologies that are 
made available to individuals by the communities they engage with and the ways they are 
socialized into the discourses of technique that signal membership in these communities. 
‘Technologies of self’ are ultimately technologies of society, which function to integrate 




It has not been my purpose in this article to make judgements about either Alcoholics 
Anonymous or the Quantified Self movement in terms of the practices of self-care their members 
engage in or the relative benefits of these practices. I have no doubt that both Lizz H. and Kevin 
Krejci have benefited a great deal from the practice they describe in these stories, as have many 
other members of these communities. I also do not wish to equate the challenges of alcoholism 
with those of Parkinson's disease. They are very different conditions requiring very different 
sorts of interventions. Finally, while I believe both of these stories are broadly representative of 
the kinds of narratives typically told in these two contexts, the purpose of this analysis is not to 
make generalizations about ‘AA stories’ or ‘QS stories’, or about the practices of self-care 
members of these two communities typically engage in. Rather, it is to highlight, in line with 
several other articles in this issue, ways that the social identities of ‘expert’ and layperson’ are 
becoming blurred in many contemporary practices of medical care, and to closely examine two 
specific ‘sites of engagement’ at which specific people, specific technologies, and specific 
discourses come together to make certain kinds of actions and certain kinds of identities possible 




1 The story of Lizz H. is available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U33NJ7qyYSY 
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